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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEONEL GARCIA-VARGAS, JR.,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20100996-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Robbery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-301, one count of
Aggravated Robbery, afirstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-302,
and one count of Possession of Burglary Tools, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code section 76-6-205, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, presiding. See Addendum A (Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment). This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this
Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Vargas Garcia's request for
jury instructions related to the lesser offenses of theft, assault, and two variants of
aggravated assault (serious bodily injury and dangerous weapon) against both victims,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

which Mr. Vargas Garcia claims are included in the charged offenses of aggravated
robbery. Crucial to this inquiry is whether the trial court erred when it reasoned that force
Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted to using merged with a theft to which he also admitted to
create robbery.
Standard of Review: "Whether a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is
appropriate presents a question of law." State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 10, 152 P.3d 315
(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). When this Court considers
"whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense jury instruction," it ;"view[s]
the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the defense.'" WL (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983)). "In addition,
when the defense requests a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, the requirements
for inclusion of the instruction 'should be liberally construed."' Id (quoting State v.
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)).
Preservation: This issue was preserved when defense counsel requested jury
instructions related to the lesser-included offenses of theft, aggravated assault (both
serious-bodily-injury and dangerous-weapon variants), and assault. R. 48-53, 144:6-19.
But even if it had not been preserved, this issue can also be reviewed for plain error. See
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 13, 10 P.3d 346.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal. Their text is provided
in full in Addendum B.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -402 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An information was filed on October 29, 2009, that charged Mr. Vargas Garcia
with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-6-302, two counts of Aggravated Assault, one a second degree felony for
allegedly inflicting serious bodily injury, and one a third degree felony for allegedly using
a dangerous weapon, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-103, and Unlawful
Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code section
76-6-205. R. 1-4.
The State filed an amended information on September 13, 2010, and, with a
stipulation by defense counsel, amended the information again on September 21, 2010. R.
28-31, 37-39. The most recent amended information retained the original information's
two Aggravated Robbery charges and Possession of Burglary Tools charge, but removed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Aggravated Assault charges because the State felt "they would have merged [with the
Aggravated Robbery charges] if a conviction were to occur." R. 37-39, 143:3.
A jury trial was held on the second amended information's charges on September
21 and 22, 2010. See R. 143-44. During the trial, defense counsel requested that the court
instruct the jury on the elements of several lesser offenses defense counsel maintained
were included in the aggravated robbery charges against each victim, including robbery,
theft, aggravated assault (both serious-bodily-injury and dangerous-weapon variants), and
assault. R. 48-53, 144:6-19 (the requested instructions are attached as Addendum C).
Defense counsel also asked the trial court to provide the jury with a self-defense
instruction. R. 52, 144:7. The trial court agreed to give the lesser included instruction on
robbery, but denied Mr. Vargas Garcia's request for instructions on theft, assault, and
aggravated assault. R. 144:52-53. When the trial court denied the assault instructions, Mr.
Vargas Garcia withdrew his request for a self-defense instruction. R. 52, 144:66.
The jury found Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of one count of Aggravated Robbery, one
count of Robbery, and one count of Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools. R. 123-24.
On November 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced Mr. Vargas Garcia to an indeterminate
term of one to fifteen years for his Robbery conviction, and an indeterminate term of five
years to life for his Aggravated Robbery conviction. R. 130-31.
On December 1, 2010, Mr. Vargas Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 132.
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. R. 140-41. This appeal
follows.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Vargas Garcia's version of the facts, as presented to the jury through the
testimony of Detective Carr, the detective who interviewed Mr. Vargas Garcia after his
arrest, is as follows: Mr. Vargas Garcia was at his girlfriend's house where he met
someone named "Freakin' Freddy." R. 144:24-25. Mr. Vargas Garcia was a regular
methamphetamine user and Freakin' Freddy provided Mr. Vargas Garcia with
methamphetamine, which they used together. R. 144:25. The next morning, Freakin'
Freddy asked Mr. Vargas Garcia if he would like to get some more methamphetamine,
but Mr. Vargas Garcia didn't have much money. R. 144:25-26, 38. Freakin' Freddy told
Mr. Vargas Garcia that he could obtain more meth from a source of his and Mr. Vargas
Garcia agreed to go with Freakin' Freddy to procure the meth. R. 144:38. When they
arrived at the source's house, they knocked on the front door, but there was no answer, so
they went around to the back of the house. R. 144:26, 39. Here, a "Mexican in red"
appeared in a window and gestured for them to come in through the garage door in the
back. R. 144:39. While in the garage and out of sight of the house's inhabitants, Mr.
Vargas Garcia saw two cell phones and, intending to steal them, put them in his
backpack. R. 144:40. Still intent on having Freakin' Freddy make a drug deal with the
sources, Mr. Vargas Garcia followed Freakin' Freddy into the house. R. 144:40-41.
But then, to Mr. Vargas Garcia's surprise, Freakin' Freddy freaked out and began
ransacking the place and asking where the drugs were. R. 144:28-29, 41. Mr. Vargas
Garcia didn't know what to do. R. 144:42. Freakin' Freddy told Mr. Vargas Garcia to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"watch the Mexican in red," who was on the floor because Freakin' Freddy had already
hit him. R. 144:29-30. The man in red began to get up and Mr. Vargas Garcia turned
downstairs and alerted Freakin' Freddy to this fact. R. 144:30. The man in red then hit
Mr. Vargas Garcia in the back and Mr. Vargas Garcia turned around and punched the
man in the face. R. 144:30-31. Mr. Vargas Garcia then went downstairs where he saw
Freakin' Freddy throw a dumbbell at a "Mexican in orange." R. 144:31. Freakin' Freddy
then continued to assault the man in orange. R. 144:31. Mr. Vargas Garcia noticed an
open cell phone and feared that the police might have been called, so he told Freakin'
Freddy that they needed to get out of there and he tossed the cell phone at the man in
orange. R. 144:31-32, 43-44. Seeing people he thought were of Mexican descent in front,
Mr. Vargas Garcia ran out the back door and climbed some fences to get away. R. 144:44.
He was soon apprehended by the police. R. 144:46. At this time, he had three cell phones
in his possession—his own cell phone that didn't function and the two cell phones he had
stolen from the garage. R. 144:32.
The people in the house told the story differently. Gabriel Tellez, the man in red,
said that he was in bed watching television when Mr. Vargas Garcia and Freakin' Freddy
entered his bedroom. R. 143:119-20. He said he had never seen either of them before. R.
143:120. He said that Mr. Vargas Garcia threatened him with a knife and demanded
money. R. 143:120-21. Freakin' Freddy had a screwdriver. R. 143:126. When he replied
that he didn't have anything, he said that Mr. Vargas Garcia hit him in the jaw with his
fist, causing him to lose consciousness. R. 143:121-22. When he regained consciousness,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he couldn't see because he had a bedspread covering him. R. 143:122-23. When he took
it off, he could tell that the place had been ransacked. R. 143:123. He tried to get up, but
Mr. Vargas Garcia and Freakin' Freddy came back and asked for money. R. 143:123.
When he responded that he didn't have any, he said that Mr. Vargas Garcia hit him again
with his hand in the face. R. 143:124. Freakin' Freddy threw a nightstand and hit him. R.
143:125. Mr. Tellez did not see Mr. Vargas Garcia or Freakin' Freddy leave, but noticed
that two cell phones were missing, as well as some of his brother's gold and money. R.
143:127-28,137.
On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out that in his initial statement to
the police, Mr. Tellez had not mentioned that his assailants had used a knife. R. 143:131.
Mr. Tellez also stated that the back door to their house looked like it had been lifted and it
had some marks. R. 143:136.
Ruben Sanchez, the man in orange, stated that he was watching television and
organizing his clothes when Mr. Vargas Garcia came in alone, holding a knife. R.
143:147-48. Mr. Sanchez claimed Mr. Vargas Garcia threatened him with the knife,
demanded money and a phone from his dresser. R. 143:148-49. Mr. Sanchez said Mr.
Vargas Garcia hit him with his fist, searched his dresser drawers, and hit him with a nineinch-long steel tool. R. 143:149-50. He claimed this instrument was left on the carpet in
his room. R. 143:170. Then Mr. Sanchez claimed that Freakin' Freddy came in and that
he and Mr. Vargas Garcia started hitting him. R. 143:150-51. Freakin' Freddy got a
dumbbell from the other room and threw it at him. R. 143:152-53. It hit and dislocated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his shoulder, after which Freakin' Freddy went upstairs. R. 143:153-54. Mr. Sanchez
testified that Mr. Vargas Garcia told him to get on the ground or things would get worse.
R. 143:154. Mr. Sanchez stated that Mr. Vargas Garcia then went upstairs and Mr.
Sanchez followed him, without Mr. Vargas Garcia noticing. R. 143:155. Mr. Sanchez said
that Freakin' Freddy took around $450 and a camera, and that Mr. Vargas Garcia took a
cell phone, a translator, and some other money. R. 143:159-62. He said they both had
backpacks and were putting things in them. R. 143:164. He also said that someone had
stolen $2,000 from one of his housemates named Raul. R. 143:170. Mr. Tellez and Mr.
Sanchez both denied being drug dealers. R. 143:113, 156-57. Mr. Tellez testified that his
shoulder no longer functions as it did before, that he can't lift things, and that he lost his
job as a result. R. 143:155-56.
On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out that Mr. Sanchez had not
written that one of the assailants had a knife in his original statement to the police. R.
143:168. Mr. Sanchez explained that the reason he did not write all of the details was
because he did not have room on the sheet of paper he was provided to tell the whole
story, and he didn't ask for another. R. 143:171-72.
Several police officers testified. One officer testified that Mr. Vargas Garcia
arrived at the scene in a patrol car and a victim pointed at him, identifying him, and that
Mr. Vargas Garcia appeared to be shouting and making faces from inside the car. R.
143:179. He testified that when he went into the victims' house, the house appeared
ransacked. R. 143:179. He saw blood downstairs on the floor and on a bed. R. 143:180.
8
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Another officer likewise testified that the upstairs had been ransacked and that there was
blood on the stairs' railing and downstairs. R. 143:184-85. While the upstairs appeared
ransacked, the downstairs appeared untouched. R. 143:194. They did not find any items
of evidentiary value in the house. R. 143:185-86. Specifically, they did not find a bloody,
nine-inch-long tool on the floor downstairs. R. 143:193.
About three feet away from the back door to the garage, officers found a backpack
with an Overstock.com logo on it. R. 143:187, 191. Inside that backpack was another
smaller backpack. R. 143:188. Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted that he had worked at
Overstock.com, but denied that either of the backpacks were his and said that the smaller
backpack belonged to Freakin' Freddy. R. 144:33-34. The smaller backpack contained
three screwdrivers, a pair of pliers, and a pair of gloves. R. 143:190. None of these tools
had blood on them. R. 143:195. The larger backpack also contained two cell phones, an
English-to-Spanish translator, a knife, a pair of underpants, and a baby's diaper. R.
143:191. Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted the knife was his, but denied having any weapons in
his hands during the course of his encounter with Mr. Tellez and Mr. Sanchez. R. 144:34,
36-37. The bags did not contain money, jewelry, or a camera. R. 143:192-93.
Additionally, the officer found an orange soda can near the fence he was told the suspects
had jumped over that matched a six pack of orange soda found in the garage, but found
no other items that matched those alleged stolen from the house. R. 143:195-96.
Finally, the officer that apprehended Mr. Vargas Garcia, approximately two
minutes after being called and less than a block from the house where the incident
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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occurred, testified that he was in possession of a paint can opener and keys that, based on
the officer's training and experience, looked like they had been modified for use as
burglary tools. R. 143:198-203; State's Ex. 20 (large overhead photograph of
neighborhood). None of the officers reported any indication of forcible entry.
After hearing all of these facts, the trial court addressed jury instructions Mr.
Vargas Garcia had requested earlier regarding the lesser-included offenses of robbery,
theft, assault, and aggravated assault, as well as a self-defense instruction. R. 48-53,
144:52-53 (attached as Addendum C). The trial court granted Mr. Vargas Garcia's
request that the jury be instructed as to the elements of robbery, but denied his request
that the jury hear instructions on the elements of theft, aggravated assault, and assault. R.
48-53, 144:52-53. The court made the following ruling:
I am denying the defendant's motion to give the
additional [instruction] of theft and assault. The reason I am
doing that is because the parties have agreed that under the
theories] of robbery that are available by law, those two
elements merge and that there is not a separate offense of
theft or a separate offense of assault under the theory of
robbery. Robbery can be committed as the State has argued by
the combination of a theft combined with force or fear; or in
the course of committing a theft, and I do find that the
elements do not sufficiently overlap according to the Baker
standard with respect to being able to give separate offenses,
that the testimony that has come in, the defendant's
admissions to . . . Detective Carr . . . , that he did take those
cell phones, that he entered the home with the intent of getting
dope there and that he took the cell phones and that force was
used, simply do not provide a rational basis for finding
independent offenses of theft and/or assaultive behavior.
That, in fact, those are the elements of robbery; they are
naturally merged together and that under the evidence that
came in through the Detective Carr of the defendant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statements, there simply is not a rational basis for separating
them into individual offenses. And because I am ruling on
that on the aggravated assault, I am continuing that same
ruling and not giving the requested lesser included
instructions as to assault with substantial bodily injury or
simple assault with bodily injury that is being requested by the
defense as well. R. 144:53-54.
When the trial court denied the assault instructions, Mr. Vargas Garcia withdrew his
request for a self-defense instruction. R. 52, 144:66. The jury was instructed on the
elements of aggravated robbery, R. 99, and robbery, R. 100, and received a party liability
instruction. R. 109. The jury convicted Mr. Vargas Garcia of aggravated robbery against
Mr. Sanchez, robbery against Mr. Tellez, and possession of burglary tools. R. 144:136.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Vargas Garcia argues that the district court erred when it denied his request
that the jury be instructed on the lesser-included offenses of theft, assault, and aggravated
assault (both dangerous-weapon and serious-bodily-injury variants), and that this Court
should reverse his convictions for aggravated robbery and robbery. Specifically, Mr.
Vargas Garcia argues that, under the facts of this case, theft, assault, and both variants of
aggravated assault are included in the charged offense of aggravated robbery and that
there was a rational basis for convicting him of the lesser offenses but acquitting him of
aggravated robbery. To this end, Mr. Vargas Garcia argues that the trial court erred when
it ruled that a theft admitted to by Mr. Vargas Garcia necessarily merged with his later
admitted use of force to constitute robbery.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MR, VARGAS GARCIA'S
CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND ROBBERY AND
REMAND SO THAT HE MAY RECEIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES OF THEFT, ASSAULT, AND TWO
VARIANTS OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Vargas Garcia's

request to instruct the jury on the elements of the lesser-included offenses of theft.,
assault, and aggravated assault because Mr. Vargas Garcia was entitled to those
instructions under the Utah and U.S. constitutions and under section 76-1-402 of the Utah
Code. "'[I]t is now beyond dispute that [a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on a
lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of
the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater."' State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah
1983) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)). And under Utah law,
to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction, this
Court engages in an evidence-based "two-pronged analysis [hereinafter, the "Baker
analysis"] that mirrors the statutory framework set out in [the Utah Code]." State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, lj 12, 6 P.3d 1116. If each of the elements of the analysis is met, the
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction. Id. ^f 15.
In the first prong of the analysis, the court must determine whether the claimed
lesser offense is "included" in the charged offense—that is, whether it fits one of the
definitions of "included" provided in section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code. Id ^| 12. In this
case, the relevant statutory definition provides that an offense is included if "[i]t is
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established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -402(3 )(a) (2008). The
elements of the lesser offense do not need to be completely contained within the charged
offense; rather the two offenses are related under this prong if'" some of their statutory
elements overlap, and the evidence at the trial of the greater offense involves proof of
some or all of those overlapping elements.'" State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869
(Utah 1998) (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159).
In the second prong of the analysis, the court must determine whether the evidence
offered provides "'a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.'" Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^f 13 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)); see also Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. In making this rational
basis determination, a trial court may not weigh the credibility of the evidence, and must
instead determine "whether there is 'a sufficient quantum of evidence' to send this issue
to the jury." Kruger, 2000 UT 60, If 14 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). The trial court
must '"view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the defense.'" Id (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983)).
"[W]hen the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative
interpretations, and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give a lesser included
offense instruction at the request of the defendant." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Even the selfserving testimony of a defendant can provide a rational basis for a jury to acquit of an
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offense. See State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 533 (Utah 1983) ("Defendant's testimony
obviously provided a basis upon which the jury could have acquitted them of second
degree murder.").
Because each of the claimed lesser offenses on which Mr. Vargas Garcia requested
jury instructions and the facts surrounding them satisfy the two elements of this analysis,
Mr. Vargas Garcia was entitled to instructions on these offenses. In this case, Mr. Vargas
Garcia was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, one count each for Mr.
Tellez and Mr. Sanchez. R. 37-38. Mr. Vargas Garcia requested instructions on the
following lesser offenses included in the aggravated robbery charges: robbery, which the
trial court granted; and theft, aggravated assault involving serious bodily injury,
aggravated assault involving a dangerous weapon, and assault, all of which the trial court
denied. R. 50-51, 144:53-54; Addendum C. The analysis below first addresses (A) the
requested theft instruction and then addresses (B) the requested assault-related
instructions. It shows that each of these lesser offenses have elements that overlap with
the charged aggravated robbery offenses that can be proved by the same evidence and that
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia, there is a
rational basis for believing he was guilty of the lesser offenses, but not guilty of the
charged offenses. Thus, Mr. Vargas Garcia was entitled to each of the requested
instructions and this Court should reverse.
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A.

Mr, Vargas Garcia Was Entitled to a Lesser-Included-Offense Instruction for
the Crime of Theft Because Theft Is Included in Aggravated Robbery and
There Is a Rational Basis to Believe Mr. Vargas Garcia Is Guilty of Theft, But
Not Aggravated Robbery.
Theft is included in aggravated robbery, and when the evidence is viewed in the

light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia, there is a rational basis to believe that Mr.
Vargas Garcia committed theft, but did not commit aggravated robbery; thus, the two
Baker elements are satisfied and Mr. Vargas Garcia is entitled to an instruction on theft.
Each of these elements is addressed in turn below.
L

The Lesser Offense of Theft Is Included in Each Aggravated Robbery Charge.
First, theft is included in aggravated robbery, the offense with which Mr. Vargas

Garcia was charged, because "[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission o f aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76l-402(3)(a). Aggravated robbery is defined in Utah by statute. Its elements are as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008) (emphasis added). Aggravated robbery explicitly
includes the elements of robbery, which means that the facts adduced at trial must
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necessarily prove the elements of robbery before a defendant may be convicted of
aggravated robbery. Robbery is also defined by statute in Utah:
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts
to take personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the
person permanently or temporarily of the personal property;
or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of committing a
theft or wrongful appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a
theft or wrongful appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful
appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2008) (emphasis added). This statute offers two paths to a
conviction for robbery: first, a defendant may be found guilty for taking personal property
from the person or immediate presence of another by force or fear; or second, a defendant
may be convicted for using force or the fear of force "in the course of committing a theft
or wrongful appropriation." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the entire crime of theft is
explicitly incorporated as an element of the second type of robbery. And since theft is
committed when a person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2008), theft
also almost certainly occurs under the first prong of robbery, as well, when a defendant
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takes the property of another with a purpose to deprive the person permanently or
temporarily thereof.
Thus, under almost any set of facts, theft "is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the commission o f aggravated robbery and,
per statute and Utah case law, is included in the charged offense. Utah Code Ann. §76-1402(3)(a); see also Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 12. Looking to the facts of this case, theft
could definitely be established by proof of the same or less facts than might be used to
prove Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of aggravated robbery. Mr. Vargas Garcia freely admitted
to taking cell phones from the victims with the intent to deprive them thereof, and so, by
his own admission, he is guilty of theft against each victim. R. 144:40. The proof of an
additional element of the use of force in the commission of this theft or in flight from the
theft would establish robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Robbery could also be
established if additional facts showed that the items stolen were taken forcibly from Mr.
Tellez and Mr. Sanchez. See id. If additional facts showed that a dangerous weapon had
been used or serious bodily injury had been caused, the facts would constitute aggravated
robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(a). Mr. Tellez and Mr. Sanchez have each
testified to facts that a jury could find elevate Mr. Vargas Garcia's lesser offense of theft
to the more serious offense of aggravated robbery, while Mr. Vargas Garcia disputes the
allegations. R. 143:119-28, 147-57; 144:24-44. Since conflicting evidence was offered
on each of these additional elements at trial, under the facts of this case, theft could be
proved by the same or fewer facts than the charged offenses of aggravated robbery—
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namely that Mr. Vargas Garcia stole cell phones. Thus, theft is included in those offenses
and the first element of the Baker analysis is satisfied. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402
(3)(a); Kruger, 2000 UT 60, K 12.
2.

There Is a Rational Basis for Convicting Mr. Vargas Garcia of Theft Against
Each Victim, But Acquitting Him of Each Aggravated Robbery Charge.
And so the only remaining question under the Baker analysis is whether, viewing

all evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia, there is a rational basis for
convicting him of theft and not of aggravated robbery. See Kruger, 2000 UT 60, Iffi 1314. This rational basis exists because, under Mr. Vargas Garcia's version of the facts, any
force he used after he committed theft was not used in the course of committing the theft
and thus does not constitute robbery under section 76-6-301 of the Utah Code. The trial
court denied Mr. Vargas Garcia's request for jury instructions on theft and assault
because, it reasoned, under the theory that robbery occurs when force is used "in the
course of committing a theft," Mr. Vargas Garcia had admitted to committing robbery by
admitting to both theft and the use of force at some time after the theft had occurred. R.
144:53-54. Based on this broad interpretation of the phrase "in the course of committing
a theft," the trial court reasoned that the two crimes merged and there was no rational
basis for the jury to believe he had not committed robbery.
But section 76-6-301 's use of the phrase "in the course of committing a theft"
cannot be read as broadly as the trial court's interpretation. Specifically, as the discussion
below will illustrate, if a thief is to be found guilty of robbery for force used "in the
commission of a theft" or "in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission," the
18
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force must be used in a manner causally related to the theft—either to retain possession of
the property, resist apprehension, facilitate escape, etc.—and that is not why Mr. Vargas
Garcia claims he used force. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Vargas
Garcia's admission to theft and the use offeree at some point after the theft constitutes an
admission to robbery under section 76-6-301 is a question of statutory interpretation that
this court reviews for correctness. See State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, ^j 5, 174 P.3d
654 (citing State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, If 16 n.7, 143 P.3d 268).
This Court's "primary objective when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislature's intent." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ^ 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This means first looking "to the statute's plain language[,]...
presuming] that the legislature used each word advisedly[,] and read[ing] each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the statute's plain language indicates that robbery occurs when force is used in "an
attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-30l(2)(a), or
"in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6301(2)(b), or "in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-30l(2)(c).
Based on this plain language, any force Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted to using in his
interview with the detective was not used "in the course of committing a theft." Certainly,
Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Tellez told very different stories than the one told by Mr. Vargas
Garcia. But the trial court's duty was to "'view the evidence and the inferences that can
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be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense.'" Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^ 14
(quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983)). Thus, a correct analysis must
examine the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia. As Mr. Vargas Garcia
told the detective who interviewed him, the primary purpose of his visit to Mr. Tellez and
Mr. Sanchez's house was to pick up methamphetamine, as he believed them to be drug
dealers with connections to Freakin' Freddy. R. 144:38-39. After being gestured in by
Mr. Tellez, Mr. Vargas Garcia committed a theft of opportunity by pocketing cell phones
in the garage, out of sight of the phone's owners. R. 144:39-40. Under Utah law, the theft
was complete the moment he took the phones without the owners' authorization with the
intent to deprive them thereof. See State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211,1213 (Utah 1980)
("Theft occurs when one obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof," (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404)).
After he had stolen the phones, he followed Freakin' Freddy into the house so that
he could proceed with the drug deal he thought Freakin' Freddy had set up. See R.
144:40. But then, to his surprise, Freakin' Freddy did not initiate a drug deal and instead
began to assault Mr. Tellez, asking him where the drugs were. R. 144:41. At one point,
Freakin' Freddy hit Mr. Tellez so hard that Mr. Tellez ended up on the ground. R.
144:41-42. Mr. Vargas Garcia did not know what to do. See R. 144:42. Freakin' Freddy
ordered him to watch the man on the ground while he went downstairs. R. 144:42. Mr.
Tellez began to get up and Mr. Vargas Garcia went downstairs to alert Freakin' Freddy to
this fact. R. 144:42. But then, Mr. Tellez hit Mr. Vargas Garcia in the back, and Mr.
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Vargas Garcia retaliated by punching Mr. Tellez in the face. R. 144:42-43. Mr. Vargas
Garcia then went downstairs and saw Freakin' Freddy throwing a dumbbell at Mr.
Sanchez. R. 144:43. Seeing an open cell phone, Mr. Vargas Garcia suspected the police
might have been called, so he threw the cell phone at Mr. Sanchez and told Freakin'
Freddy that they had to get out of there. R. 144:43. Mr. Vargas Garcia left the house and
was apprehended with the two cell phones he had taken from the garage. R. 144:32, 46.
At no point in his interview with the detective did Mr. Vargas Garcia indicate that Mr.
Tellez or Mr. Sanchez were aware that he had stolen the phones.
When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia—that
is, when discrepancies between his statement to the detective and the testimonies of Mr.
Tellez and Mr. Sanchez are resolved in favor of Mr. Vargas Garcia's version of events—
he certainly committed the crime of theft the moment he pocketed the cell phones in the
garage. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Eagle, 611 P.2d at 1213. But he did not commit
robbery under the plain language of any of the subsections of section 301. Subsection 2(a)
does not apply, because Mr. Vargas Garcia did not attempt to commit theft; he did
commit theft. And by the time Mr. Vargas Garcia entered the house, he had already
committed theft, so any force he used, by subsection (2)(b)'s plain language, was no
longer being used "in the commission of theft," as that phrase is ordinarily understood in
common usage and under Utah law, since the theft had already been accomplished in the
garage by the time Mr. Vargas Garcia used force in the house, and the force was not used
to maintain possession of the stolen phones since neither Mr. Sanchez nor Mr. Tellez
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knew the phones had been stolen. Nor was it used "in the immediate flight" from the
theft, as described in subsection (2)(c), because Mr. Vargas Garcia was notfleeingat the
time he used force, but was responding to violence started by Freakin' Freddy and
continued by Mr. Tellez. Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr.
Vargas Garcia, force was not used in any of the three situations that comprise the
definition of "in the course of committing a theft" contained in section 301. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301. Therefore, there is a rational basis for a jury to find that Mr. Vargas
Garcia committed theft, but not aggravated robbery, so he was entitled to his requested
lesser-included instruction under section 301's plain language.
But even if there is some ambiguity to the phrase "in the course of committing a
theft," and it can be read more broadly than the plain language indicates, it cannot be read
as broadly as the trial court read it—that is, as an unrelated use of force at some point
recently after a theft has occurred. When a statute's meaning cannot be discerned by its
plain language, this Court may look to legislative history, case law, sister state law, and
relevant policy considerations to aid its interpretation. Arbogast Family Trust v. River
Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, ^ 19, 238 P.3d 1035; American Bush v. City of South Salt
Lake, 2006 UT 40, U 87, 140 P.3d 1235; State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^ 7, 31 P.3d 528.
Each of these other sources support interpreting section 30 Ts "in the course of
committing a theft" language to mean only force used in a manner causally related to the
theft—to retain possession of stolen property, resist apprehension, or facilitate escape,
etc.—and not any force used at some point recently after a theft has been committed.
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In fact, this Court has already examined the Legislature's adoption of the "in the
course of committing a theft" language in its 1996 case, State in re D.B., 925 P.2d 178,
181-82 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). There, this Court explained that the adoption of this
language into the Utah Code in 1995, which closely mirrors similar language in the
Model Penal Code, means "that force need not be exerted at the beginning of the theft to
qualify as a robbery; force need only be exerted at sometime during the entire course of
the transaction. This definition of robbery is known as the 'transactional' approach to
robbery." InreDJB., 925 P.2d at 181-82; compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp.
1996) with Model Penal Code § 222.1 (1981) ("A person is guilty of robbery if, in the
course of committing a theft, he .. . threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear
of immediate serious bodily injury . . . . An act shall be deemed 'in the course of
committing a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt
or commission."). This Court held that this is the view of robbery the Legislature intended
to codify when it amended the robbery statute in 1995, citing a statement by
Representative Patricia Larsen during the bill's floor debates that "made clear the
amendment was an attempt to clarify Utah's law on robbery as covering a broad
transactional approach." In re D.B., 925 P.2d at 182 n.5 (citing Tape of Utah House Floor
Debates, 51st Legislature, General Session (March 1, 1995) (Statement of Rep. Patricia
Larsen)).
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Looking at the entirety of Representative Larsen's statement examined by this
Court in In re D.B., the contours of the transactional approach to robbery become even
clearer:
Substitute House Bill #37 makes a technical change in
the definition of robbery. Under current law, robbery covers
only the taking of property by force or fear, and not enough
cases where force or fear is used to actually maintain the
possession of stolen property. I'll give you a little example . . .
. A suspect walks into a minimart and shoplifts a six pack of
beer by concealing it under his coat, and on the way out of the
store, a store employee comes to stop the suspect and recover
the beer. The suspect threatens the employee, hits him, and
flees with the beer. Now, in the example, the taking of the
beer has actually occurred without force or fear. And the
suspect could be charged with the theft without ever having
left the store under Utah case law. However, the suspect's
maintaining the possession of the thus stolen beer was
accomplished by means of force and fear. And this conduct
should be treated in the same manner as a person who initially
takes the property by force or fear. Now there are some courts
that have ruled that this is a robbery, but other courts have
ruled that no robbery has occurred and have instead charged
the suspect with two misdemeanors—theft and assault. This
legislation makes it clear that if one steals or attempts to steal
property by using force or fear, he is actually guilty of robbery
and not simple misdemeanor offenses. Robbery is a very
confrontational crime and should be treated as such. Either
case should be classified as a robbery and it's more of a crime
against a person than a crime against the property. This piece
of legislation attempts to address the violent offenders.
Tape of Utah House Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General Session (March 1, 1995)
(Statement of Rep. Patricia Larsen) (emphases added), available at
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp7S
Representative Larsen's statement shows that the amendment to the robbery statute was
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meant to expand punishment to the kind of confrontational behavior used when a person
"steals or attempts to steal property by using force or fear." Id. When one is willing to use
force to effect a theft, it makes little difference if that force is used initially to obtain the
property, or later to maintain possession of the property—both are confrontational acts
viewed by our Legislature as moral equivalents to "be treated in the same manner." Id.
What is not equivalent is theft followed by the use of force brought on by some
other intervening event when the thief has not even been confronted about the stolen
property. This violence cannot be said to be part of the same transaction. It is completely
unrelated to the theft and is not equivalent to someone using force to obtain or maintain
wrongful possession of another's property, as in Representative Larsen's example. It is
not "stealing] property by using force or fear" and thus is not part of the transaction.
Since in this case, Mr. Vargas Garcia claims to have only used force in reaction to a
melee started by Freakin' Freddy, under Representative Larsen's explanation of the
statute, Mr. Vargas Garcia's force was not used to maintain possession of the stolen
property or to effect the theft, and thus was not used in the course of committing a theft.
Indeed, since Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez were allegedly unaware of Mr. Vargas Garcia's
theft, it cannot be said that force or fear were used to steal the property, which is the
criminal action Representative Larsen stated the amendment was designed to address.
Thus, section 301's legislative history weighs in favor of categorizing Mr. Vargas
Garcia's description of his actions as theft but not robbery.
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In addition to addressing section 301's legislative history in InreD.B.. this Court
also examined similar law from other jurisdictions. In defining the transactional approach
to robbery, which this Court held applied in the robbery statute both before and after the
1995 amendment, this Court relied on reasoning from State v. Handburgh. a case from
Washington that set forth the policy behind the transactional approach. In re D.B., 925
P.2d at 181 & n.4-5 (citing 830 P.2d 641, 644-15 (Wash. 1992)) (holding that the
amended version of the statute merely clarified the Legislature's intent that Utah use the
transactional approach). In that case, the Washington court had to decide whether a
robbery had occurred when the defendant stole a girl's bicycle outside of the girl's
presence, but then threw rocks at her and punched her when she tried to retrieve it—that
is, the court had to determine if a robbery occurs not only when force is used during a
theft, but also when force is used immediately after a theft to retain the stolen goods.
Handburgh. 830 P.2d at 641^12. The court held that such facts do constitute robbery
under Washington's statute, which uses language "similar to the Model Penal Code" and
Utah's current robbery statute. See id. at 645.
Quoting the same language from Model Penal Code commentaries that this Court
did in In re D.B., the court explained that the primary reason for allowing a conviction of
robbery for using force in the course of, or in flight from, a theft (as Utah's robbery
statute allows) is that """the thief s willingness to use force against those who would
restrain him in flight suggests that he would have employed force to effect the theft had
the need arisen.""" InreD.B.. 925 P.2d at 182 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting
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Handburgh, 830 P.2d at 645 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 8.11, at 786
(2d ed. 1986) (quoting 2 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries §
222.1, at 104 (Official Draft & Rev. Comments, 1980)))). Thus, the Supreme Court of
Washington reasoned, "it is sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction if force is used to
retain possession of the property, resist apprehension, or facilitate escape." Handburgh,
830 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added). It concluded, "the force necessary to support a robbery
conviction need not be used in the initial acquisition of the properly. Rather, the retention,
via force against the property owner, of property initially taken peaceably or outside the
presence of the property owner, is robbery." Id. (emphasis added). Of crucial import to
the issue in this case is the way the Washington court limits robbery under the
transactional approach to situations where force is used to help "effect [a] theft [if] the
need arise[s]," such as when force is used to retain possession of stolen property, resist
apprehension, or facilitate escape. Id Such an approach demands that a court look to the
context in which force is used, not just its timing.
And the Washington court is not alone in its approach. Handburgh cites a litany of
cases from states that have adopted the transactional approach, all supportive of the
position that the context in which force is used matters to a crime's characterization as
robbery. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982)
(considering "the time, place and circumstances surrounding a theft" to find robbery
where a thief used a knife to dissuade pursuit by a store employee who saw him steal
clothes (emphasis added)), overruled by Hobson v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 478,
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482-83 (Ky. 2010) (holding that force can only elevate theft to robbery if used with intent
to accomplish theft); Winborne v. State, 455 A.2d 357, 359 (Del 1982) (holding that a
robbery occurred where a car thief strangled a victim "to prevent or overcome her
resistance to the theft of the automobile" (emphasis added)); State v. Mirault 457 A.2d
455 (N.J. 1983) (finding an assault took place "in the course of committing a theft"
because the assault and the theft were "closely connected in point of time, place, and
causal connection and are integral parts of one continuous transaction" (emphases
added)); People v. Anderson, 414 P.2d 366, 369 (Cal. 1966) (finding robbery occurred
where defendant used "force or fear in removing, or attempting to remove, the property
from the owner's immediate presence" (emphasis added)); People v. Kennedy, 294
N.E.2d 788, 790 (1973) (finding robbery where force was used "to complete the taking of
the money from the possession and custody of its custodian, and was a means used to
accomplish such taking" (emphasis added)); Patterson v. Sheriff, 562 P.2d 1134, 1135
(Nev. 1977) (holding that the use offeree "to prevent an immediate retaking" of a stolen
purse constitutes robbery (emphasis added)); Lightner v. State, 535 S.W.2d 176, 178
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (finding robbery where the defendant "injured [a] police officer
in an effort to maintain control of the stolen property while in immediate flight from the
theft" (emphasis added)).
Defining and limiting robbery, as the Washington court did and these other courts
have done, to the use of force for very specific purposes causally related to accomplishing
a theft—such as retaining stolen property, avoiding apprehension, or facilitating escape—
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is beneficial for three reasons. First, it effectively addresses Representative Larsen's
concern that a thief s willingness to use force or fear to steal property ought to be
punished the same regardless of when the force occurs. But second, limiting the use of
force to specific situations related to the theft ensures that only thieves who are willing to
use force or fear to effect a theft are punished as robbers. If some intervening event
unrelated to a theft occurs that the thief feels necessitates a forceful response, the force
the thief then uses is not evidence of the thief s willingness or intent to use force to effect
the theft (Representative Larsen's concern), it is rather evidence of the thief s intent to
use force to respond to the intervening event. Thus, the Washington court's limitations
most accurately address Representative Larsen's concerns because they do not allow for
punishing a thief additionally for using force in some proximate but unrelated
confrontation as this force is not evidence of willingness to use force to effect a theft.1
Finally, this clear line of demarcation avoids vagueness and the potential danger of
inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the robbery statute. The policy behind this
approach is supported by the plain language of Utah's robbery statute, the explanation of
the representative who argued on its behalf, this Court's interpretation of the statute, the

1 For instance, if "in the course of committing a theft" were defined as meaning merely
"at some point in time near the theft," and was not limited, as by the Washington court, to
force used to retain stolen property, resist apprehension, or facilitate escape, a shoplifter
could be punished as a robber for using force to defend a child from a kidnapper in the
store from which he is shoplifting. But this use of force, however proximate in time to the
shoplifter's theft, does not indicate a willingness to use force to accomplish the theft and
thus should not be punished as robbery.
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Washington court's interpretation of its similar statute, and many other states'
interpretations of their transactional robbery statutes.2
Perhaps the most on-point application of this approach to a set of facts similar to
the present case is State v. Villanueva, a New Jersey case decided after this Court issued
InreD.B. and after the Washington court decided Handburgh. 862 A.2d 1195 (N J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). New Jersey's robbery statute, much like the Utah statute,
follows the transactional approach in that a person is guilty of robbery if "in the course of
committing a theft . . . he uses force upon another," where "in the course of committing a
theft" means "in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1 (West 2011); see also State v. Grissom, 790
A.2d 928, 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (reversing for a lesser included
instruction where "[t]here [was] sufficient evidence . . . from which a jury could conclude

2 In fact, Kentucky has incorporated language similar to Representative Larsen's
explicitly into its robbery statute, which reads that "'[a] person is guilty of robbery in the
first degree when, in the course of committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate
use of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish the theft.'" Hobson v.
Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Ky. 2010) (quoting KRS 515.020; KRS 515.030).
The Kentucky court used this language to hold that a defendant who used force after his
attempt at theft had been foiled to avoid arrest and prosecution was not guilty of robbery
because the defendant no longer had any intention to "accomplish the theft." Id. at 483.
While this result would likely not obtain under Utah law—because our robbery statute
also punishes force used in an escape from an attempt to commit theft, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-3 01(2)(c)—the focus on intent is important as it shows that the purpose of the
transactional approach is to punish those who would use force to accomplish theft. Or, in
the words of Representative Larsen, "[t]his legislation makes it clear that if one steals or
attempts to steal property by using force or fear, he is actually guilty of robbery." Tape of
Utah House Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General Session (March 1, 1995) (Statement
of Rep. Patricia Larsen).
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that defendant's pointing of his handgun at the taxi driver was part of the continuous
transaction of refusing to pay the fare and accomplished before his flight was complete,
and convict him offirst-degreearmed robbery," but there was "also sufficient evidence in
the record from which the jury could have concluded that defendant reached a point of at
least temporary safety . . . when he exited the cab and that his pointing of the gun was a
separate offense" (emphasis added)). In Villanueva, the defendant admitted to attempting
to steal a car radio when he was interrupted and confronted by the victim. 862 A.2d at
1197. At this point, the testimony of the victim and the defendant diverged—the victim
alleged that the defendant exited feet first out of the vehicle, was chased by the victim,
and swung at the victim, at which point, the victim put the defendant in a choke hold. Id.
at 1197-98. The defendant alleged that the victim initiated the confrontation by hitting
him in the head with a wooden bat while he was trying to steal the victim's radio. Id. at
1199. The defendant ran and the victim and his father gave chase and threw a bat at the
defendant. Id. At this point, the defendant alleged he stopped to give up, but that the
victim lunged at the defendant and put him in a choke hold. Id. The defendant was able to
free himself, but got hit again and was immobilized. Id.
Even though "defense counsel inexplicably did not seek an attempted theft charge
at the conclusion of the trial," the appellate court found that the lower court committed
plain error by "failing to charge theft" because "the jury could have viewed the
defendant's conduct after he was discovered in [the victim's] car as causally unrelated to
the theft or as justified on the grounds of self-defense." Id. at 1199-1200 (emphasis
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added); accord Williams v. State, 314 S.W.3d 45, 51-53 (Tex. App. 2010)
("[Defendant's] testimony that his use of force was not done with the intent to facilitate a
theft but rather to fend off an unprovoked assault may be weak evidence, and it was
certainly contradicted by the testimony of the [victims]. But it is sufficient for a jury who
believed it to conclude that [defendant] was guilty of theft but not robbery....
Accordingly, [defendant] was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included
offense of theft.") Applying this logic to the case at hand and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Mr. Vargas Garcia, there is a rational basis for finding him guilty
of theft, but not of aggravated robbery, because he alleges that any force he used was
"causally unrelated" to the theft.
Whether Mr. Vargas Garcia's punch or throwing of the cell phone constituted
assault, they did not constitute the use of force in the commission of the theft he had
admitted to because the theft had already occurred and the force was not "causally
related" to the theft—that is, it was not used to retain the stolen property, resist
apprehension, or facilitate escape. Indeed, according to Mr. Vargas Garcia, the only
reason he had used force at all was because Freakin' Freddy's unexpected violent
outburst resulted in a melee that left him confused and needing to defend himself. In fact,
Mr. Vargas Garcia says that he only hit Mr. Tellez after Mr. Tellez punched him,, The
purpose of the punch was in no way related to the theft as Mr. Tellez did not even know
he had stolen the phones, but was to retaliate or even to defend himself against being
punched. The punch and the throwing of the cell phone were not intended to retain stolen
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property, resist apprehension, or facilitate escape. In fact, Mr. Vargas Garcia fully
intended not to run away after stealing the phones, because, as the court acknowledged,
"he entered the home with the intent of getting dope there." R. 144:53-54.
The policy behind the transactional approach—punishing the thief for the
willingness to use force to effect a theft had the need arisen—is also not served here. Mr.
Vargas Garcia's use of force to defend himself or to retaliate against being punched after
Freakin' Freddy unexpectedly "freaked out" does not demonstrate a willingness to use
force to effect a theft. Thus, Mr. Vargas Garcia's version of the events indicates that the
force he used was not used in the commission of a theft or in flight therefrom, and as
such, does not merge with the theft to create robbery.
Just as in Villanueva, under Mr. Vargas Garcia's version of the events, there is a
rational basis to believe he committed theft, but that he did not use force in the
commission of the theft or in flight therefrom, and thus did not commit robbery or
aggravated robbery. See Kruger, 2000 UT 60,fflf13-14. Thus, the facts of this case
satisfy both of the Baker requirements for a lesser-included instruction, because theft is
included in aggravated robbery and there is a rational basis for a jury to find Mr. Vargas
Garcia guilty of theft but not guilty of aggravated robbery. And so it was error for the trial
court not to instruct the jury on theft.
Additionally, "when an element of the crime is in dispute, and the evidence is
consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct
on the lesser included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial and [this
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Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24,
152 P.3d 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the use of force in the
commission of the theft is in dispute and certain evidence is consistent with both Mr.
Vargas Garcia's and the State's versions of the case, these elements are met and the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense presumptively affected
the outcome of the trial. Thus, this court should reverse and remand so that Mr. Vargas
Garcia may receive a new trial with a lesser-included instruction regarding theft.3

3 The arguments regarding all of the lesser-included instructions addressed in this brief
were preserved when defense counsel specifically moved for those instructions. R. 48-53,
144:6-19. But even if they were not preserved, this Court may reach the arguments
because the error of merging theft and a later use of force not related to that theft into
robbery is plain error; as is denying a defendant a lesser-included instruction when there
is a rational basis for that instruction. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 13, 10 P.3d
346. Plain error exists if there is an error that should have been obvious to the district
court that is harmful to the defendant. Id. "An error is obvious if the law on the area was
'sufficiently clear or plainly settled[.]"' State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, ^ 5, 113 P.3d
998 (quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,ffi|16-17, 95 P.3d 276). The wealth of case law
illustrating that there must be some causal connection between a theft and a subsequent
use of force to constitute robbery under the transactional approach shows that the law in
this area is plainly settled. See pp. 23-32 supra. When those elements are not merged as
the trial court mistakenly held they were, there is a rational basis for convicting Mr.
Vargas Garcia of each of the requested lesser-included offenses, but not of aggravated
robbery. See Part I.A., supra, Part LB. infra. It is plainly settled in Utah that when there is
'"a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense,'" he is entitled to that instruction. Kruger, 2000
UT 60, If 13 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2008)). Thus, it was plain error for
the trial court not to offer the requested instructions. See Villanueva, 862 A.2d 1195,
1199-1200 (holding it was plain error not to offer a lesser-included instruction on
attempted theft when "the jury could have viewed the defendant's conduct after he was
discovered in [the victim's] car as causally unrelated to the theft or as justified on the
grounds of self-defense." (emphasis added)).
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B.

Mr, Vargas Garcia Was Entitled to a Lesser-Included-Offense Instruction for
the Crimes of Aggravated Assault (Both Dangerous-Weapon and SeriousBodily-Injury Variants) and Assault Because Those Crimes Are Included in
Aggravated Robbery and There Is a Rational Basis to Believe Mr. Vargas
Garcia Is Guilty of Those Crimes, But Not Aggravated Robbery.
Aggravated assault and assault are included in aggravated robbery, and "'the

evidence would permit a jury rationally to find'" Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of assault or
aggravated assault against both victims, but not of aggravated robbery; thus, the two
Baker elements are satisfied and Mr. Vargas Garcia is entitled to instructions on
aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah
1983) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973). Each of these
elements is addressed in turn below.
1.

The Lesser Offenses of Aggravated Assault and Assault Are Included in
Aggravated Robbery
First, aggravated assault and assault are included in aggravated robbery, the

offenses with which Mr. Vargas Garcia was charged, because they are "established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission o f
aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). Aggravated robbery is defined in
Utah by statute and its elements are detailed in full in Part LA, supra. The elements
relevant to the lesser offenses of aggravated assault and assault are: "A person commits
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use
a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; [or] (b) causes serious bodily injury
upon another

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (emphases added). Aggravated robbery

explicitly includes the elements of robbery, which means that the facts adduced at trial
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must necessarily prove the elements of robbery before a defendant may be convicted of
aggravated robbery. Part LA, supra, also fully details the elements of robbery. The
elements relevant to aggravated assault and assault are:
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts
to take personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the
person permanently or temporarily of the personal property;
or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of committing a
theft or wrongful appropriation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (emphasis added).
While the crime of theft is explicitly incorporated as an element of at least one way
to commit robbery, the crimes of assault and aggravated assault are not. Thus, it is
necessary to look at the elements of those crimes to illustrate how the same or fewer facts
necessary to prove Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of aggravated robbery might have been used
in this case to prove guilt of those crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a); Kruger,
2000 UT 60, U 12. Aggravated assault is defined by statute in Utah. Its elements are:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if the person
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and uses:
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1 -601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony,
except under Subsection (2)(b).
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily
injury is a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2008) (emphases added). Assault is explicitly included as a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

necessary element of aggravated assault, which means that aggravated assault is never
committed unless assault is also committed. Thus, assault is always proved by the same or
fewer facts as aggravated assault, and is thus an included offense, because aggravated
assault is always assault with the additional facts of the use of a dangerous weapon or the
use of other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. In Utah,
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2008).
The elements of assault not only overlap with, but also nearly perfectly match an
element of robbery and aggravated robbery. And the elements of aggravated assault also
overlap with the elements of aggravated robbery such that "the evidence at the trial of the
[aggravated robbery] involves proof of some or all of those overlapping elements.'" See
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998) (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159).
This is easily illustrated in the present case: Mr. Vargas Garcia was charged with the
aggravated robberies of both Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez. In his interview with the
detective, Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted to punching Mr. Tellez and throwing a phone at
Mr. Sanchez. R. 144:30-31, 43-44. If a jury believed these actions were unlawful
attempts to do bodily injury to Mr. Tellez and Mr. Sanchez, the proof of these facts would
establish assault against each victim. See Utah Code Ann. 76-5-102(l)(a). But Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

Sanchez and Mr. Tellez also testified (and Mr. Vargas Garcia denies) that this and other
uses of force, including threatening with a knife, were used in the course of unlawfully
demanding and taking their property. If these additional facts were established, they
would constitute aggravated robbery against each victim. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6301(l)(a)-(b). Thus, in this case, assault can be proved by the same or fewer facts than
aggravated robbery.
And since Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Tellez testified that Mr. Vargas Garcia threatened
them with a knife, a dangerous weapon under Utah Code section 76-1-601 (an "item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury," Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(a)
(2008)), such a threat would constitute the dangerous-weapon variant of aggravated
assault against each victim. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a). If the prosecution were
able to establish that the knife was used in the course of unlawfully demanding and taking
the property of Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez, as they allege, these facts would constitute
the charged offenses of aggravated robbery against each victim. See Utah Code Ann. §
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1 )(a)-(b). Thus, the dangerous-weapon variant of aggravated
assault can be established by proof of the same or fewer facts than aggravated robbery.
Additionally, if the jury were to believe that Mr. Vargas Garcia intentionally aided
Freakin' Freddy in his assaults on Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez as they were instructed by
the court to consider, R. 109, and as the State argued for in its closing, R. 144:99-100, the
jury might also believe that Mr. Sanchez's shoulder dislocation constituted "serious
bodily injury" and that the nightstand Freakin' Freddy threw at Mr. Tellez was likely to
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cause serious bodily injury. Upon finding such facts, the jury could find Mr. Vargas
Garcia guilty of the serious-bodily-injury variant of aggravated assault against each
victim. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b). If the State were able to additionally prove that
Freakin' Freddy used the force for the assault in the course of unlawfully taking property,
and that the nightstand did cause Mr. Tellez serious bodily injury, and that Mr. Vargas
Garcia "had the mental state required to commit the offense[s]" of aggravated robbery, R.
109; see Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (2008) (party liability statute), those facts would
establish the charged offenses of aggravated robbery against each victim. Thus, the
serious-bodily-injury variant of aggravated assault can be established by the same or
fewer facts than aggravated robbery.
A fact-intensive analysis reveals that, in this case, the requested lesser offenses of
assault, aggravated assault (dangerous weapon variant), and aggravated assault (serious
bodily injury variant) could have been "established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission o f aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. §
76-l-402(3)(a); Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). Thus,
those lesser offenses are included in the charged offenses of aggravated robbery and the
first of the two Baker elements is satisfied.
2.

There Is a Rational Basis for Convicting Mr. Vargas Garcia ofAssault and
Each Variant ofAggravated Assault Against Each Victim But Acquitting Him of
Aggravated Robbery.
Mr. Vargas Garcia's request for jury instructions on the lesser-included crimes of

assault and both variants of aggravated assault satisfies the second element of the Baker
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analysis because there is a rational basis to find Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of the lesserincluded assault crimes, but not guilty of aggravated robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 761-402(4); Kruger, 2000 UT 60,1j 13; Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Because both elements of
the Baker analysis are satisfied with regard to the assault crimes, Mr. Vargas Garcia was
entitled to jury instructions on those offenses. See Kruger, 2000 UT 60, *| 15. This section
proceeds by analyzing the rational basis for conviction of each of the denied assaultrelated offenses and resolves all evidentiary ambiguities in favor of the interpretation of
the evidence that would "permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the
lesser," Baker, 671 P.2d at 159, which sometimes is consistent with Mr. Vargas Garcia's
version of events, and sometimes is consistent with Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez's version.
See State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The jury is free to believe
or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony.").4 This section presumes as true the
argument in Part I.A.2, supra, that theft followed by a merely temporally proximate use of
force is not robbery, but potentially theft and assault, or theft and aggravated assault.
First, there is a rational basis to find that Mr. Vargas Garcia committed the crime
of assault, but did not commit the crime of aggravated robbery. Accepting Mr. Vargas
Garcia's version of events as true, he admitted to punching Mr. Tellez and throwing a
phone at Mr. Sanchez. R. 143:30-31, 43-44. A jury could consider either of these "act[s],
committed with unlawful force or violence, that... creates a substantial risk of bodily

4 Because the rational basis for these instructions involves accepting certain of Messrs.
Tellez and Sanchez's allegations and rejecting certain of Mr. Vargas Garcia's defenses, it
is important to note that admitting there is a rational basis to find Mr. Vargas Garcia
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injury to another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. Mr. Vargas Garcia never gives a lawful
reason for throwing the cell phone at Mr. Sanchez, and although Mr. Vargas Garcia
claimed to the detective that punching Mr. Tellez was an act of self-defense and has not
admitted to assault, given Mr. Tellez's testimony to the contrary, a jury could rationally
believe Mr. Vargas Garcia assaulted both Messrs. Sanchez and Tellez. Accepting those
facts as true, there is a rational basis for finding that the charged offenses of robbery and
aggravated robbery were not committed because Mr. Vargas Garcia denies taking any
property from Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez except the cell phones he found in the garage,
and the force that Mr. Vargas Garcia used was not related to that theft, but was related to
the melee started by Freakin' Freddy. See supra Part I.A.2. Thus, there is a rational basis
for convicting Mr. Vargas Garcia of assault against both victims, but not aggravated
robbery.
Alternatively, a jury could believe that, in addition to throwing the cell phone at
Mr. Sanchez and the punch at Mr. Tellez, Mr. Vargas Garcia also threatened them with a
knife, since both Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez testified to that effect. R. 143:120-21, 148—
49. Although Mr. Vargas Garcia denied using a knife and denies committing aggravated
assault, R. 144:34, 36-37, based on Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez's testimony to the
contrary, there is a rational basis to believe that, after stealing the cell phones in the
garage, Mr. Vargas Garcia intended to buy drugs, but when Freakin' Freddy freaked out,
he threatened Messrs. Sanchez and Tellez with a knife in the ensuing melee. But, as

guilty of the lesser offenses is not an admission of guilt to those offenses.
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discussed in Part I.A.2, supra, these facts would not constitute aggravated robbery
because the assaults were not committed in the course of committing a theft. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-30l(l)(b). They would, however, constitute aggravated assault, i.e., a
threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force and a dangerous weapon. See § 76-5103(l)(a). Thus, there was also a rational basis for the jury to find Mr. Vargas Garcia not
guilty of aggravated robbery of both victims, but guilty of the dangerous-weapon variant
of aggravated assault against both victims.
Finally, although Mr. Vargas Garcia told the detective that when Freakin' Freddy
freaked out, he didn't know what to do and, by virtue of his not-guilty plea, denies being
Freakin' Freddy's accomplice, R. 144:42, both victims alleged they acted together, see,
e.g., R. 143:123-24, 150-51, and Mr. Vargas Garcia admitted to taking an order from
Freakin' Freddy and watching Mr. Tellez. R. 144:29-30. This evidence provides a
rational basis for finding that Mr. Vargas Garcia was Freakin' Freddy's accomplice in his
assaults against Messrs. Tellez and Sanchez because it is circumstantial evidence that Mr.
Vargas Garcia "had the mental state required to commit" assault. See Utah Code Ann.
§76-2-202. The jury was instructed that Mr. Vargas Garcia could be liable for Freakin'
Freddy's actions, R. 109, and the State argued for such liability in its closing, R. 144:99100. Since a jury could find that Mr. Tellez's dislocated shoulder constituted serious
bodily injury, and could also find that when Freakin' Freddy threw the nightstand at Mr.
Sanchez, it was "likely to produce .. . serious bodily injury," there is a rational basis for
finding Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of the serious-bodily-injury variant of aggravated assault
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as Freakin' Freddy's accomplice. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b). Taking Mr. Vargas
Garcia at his word that he truly expected a peaceful drug deal and was only reacting to
Freakin' Freddy's attacks, there is also a rational basis to believe that he did not know that
Freakin' Freddy also intended to rob the victims, and thus lacked "the mental state
required to commit" any robbery Freakin' Freddy may have committed. Thus, there is a
rational basis for finding Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of the serious-bodily-injury variant of
aggravated assault for both victims and not guilty of aggravated robbery for both victims.
Thus, the facts of this case satisfy both of the Baker requirements for lesserincluded instructions related to assault and both aggravated assault variants, because those
crimes are included in aggravated robbery and there is a rational basis for a jury to find
Mr. Vargas Garcia guilty of those crimes (even if he did not admit to them) but not guilty
of aggravated robbery. Thus, it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury on the
assault-related lesser-included offenses and this Court should reverse.
Additionally, "when an element of the crime is in dispute, and the evidence is
consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct
on the lesser included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial and [this
Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Vargas Garcia disputes that he either forcibly and
unlawfully took property from Messrs. Sanchez and Tellez or used force in the
commission of theft against them, and certain evidence is consistent with both Mr. Vargas
Garcia's and the State's versions of the case, Spillers's elements are met and the trial
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court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses presumptively affected
the outcome of the trial. Further, prejudice exists even if this Court should find that there
is only a rational basis for one of the lesser-included instructions, but not the others, since
it still denies Mr. Vargas Garcia the opportunity to present his "theory of the case." See
Id. Thus, this court should reverse and remand so that Mr. Vargas Garcia may receive a
new trial with lesser-included instructions regarding theft, assault, and both variants of
aggravated assault.
CONCLUSION
Because the crimes of theft, assault, dangerous-weapon aggravated assault, and
serious-bodily-injury aggravated assault are all included in aggravated robbery, and
because there is a rational basis to believe that Mr. Vargas Garcia committed the lesser
crimes but not the charged crimes of aggravated robbery, Mr. Vargas Garcia was entitled
to instructions on each of those lesser offenses. Because the trial court denied his request
for those instructions, this Court should reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial
so that the jury may be instructed on the lesser offenses.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9 ^ day of April, 2011.

I RICH HAWKES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
LEONEL GARCIA JR VARGAS,
Defendant.

Case No: 091908593 FS
Judge:
ANN BOYDEN
Date:
November 8, 2 010

PRESENT
Clerk:
patd
Prosecutor: MAY, THADDEUS J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILSON, SCOTT A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 3, 1988
Audio
Tape Number:
S42
Tape Count: 1110-1127
CHARGES
1. ROBBERY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/22/2010 Guilty
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/22/2010 Guilty
3. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/22/2010 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Paae 1

Case No: 091908593 Date:

Nov 08, 2010

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Run Concurrently With Each Count and Concurrently With #101901947,
#101902125, #101905027
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
LEO GARCAS
LEONEL GARCIA-VARGAS
ALEJANDRO SALINAS

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Defendant Given Credit for Time Served on Count 3 for Time Served
in Adult Detention Center
s*fge&&*£>*^
Restitution
/^C^JT^S^s.
The amount of Restitution is still to be determined. ^ - kJ^""
'V--'V/ T A
Date:

ANN BOYDEN
fl< ; "N"
District Court Jtlglg-e"^"^
STAMP USED AT DIGESTION OF JUDGE '
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (2008)
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-Included
offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
Provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity
of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2008)
§ 76-1-601. Definitions

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means:
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402;
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2);
(f) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;
(g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4);
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (h);
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or
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if
committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through
(i).
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is
capable of acting.
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership,
or unincorporated association.
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control
over tangible property.
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing
information in a form capable of being preserved.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2008)
§ 76-2-202, Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for
conduct of another

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2008)
§ 76-5-102, Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury
to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to
another.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (2008)
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and uses:
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection
(2Kb).
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree
felony.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-205 (2008)
§ 76-6-205. Manufacture or possession of instrument for burglary or theft
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device, article, or other
thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission
of any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some
person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (2008)
§ 76-6-301. Robbery
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property
in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person
permanently or temporarily of the personal property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (2008)
§ 76-6-302, Aggravated robbery

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (2008)
§ 76-6-404. Theft-Elements
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
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SCOTT A. WILSON (#10486)
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Attorney for Defendant
Third Judicial District
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
^
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 091908593FS

LEONEL GARCIA VARGAS, JR.,

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

Defendant.

The defendant, LEONEL GARCIA VARGAS, JR., by and through his attorney of
record, SCOTT A. WILSON, respectfully requests this court in its charge to submit the
attached Jury Instruction.
DATED this j l _ day of September, 2010.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

W y
:OTT A. WILSON
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Jury Instructions to the office of the Salt
Lake City District Attorney, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this

day September, 2010.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Under the evidence presented to you in this case, you may find Leonel
Garcia Vargas, Jr., guilty or not guilty of one of the following:
1. Aggravated Robbery of Ruben Sanchez, in Instruction No.
la. Aggravated Robbery of Gabriel Tellez, in Instruction No.
or
2. Robbery of Ruben Sanchez in Instruction No.
2a. Robbery of Gabriel Tellez in Instruction No.

3. Theft from Ruben Sanchez in Instruction No.
3a. Theft from Gabriel Tellez in Instruction No.
You may also find Leonel Garcia Vargas, Jr. guilty or not guilty of one of
e following:
4. Aggravated Assault of Ruben Sanchez, serious bodily injury, in
Instruction No.
4a. Aggravated Assault of Gabriel Tellez, serious bodily injury, in
Instruction No.
or
5. Aggravated Assault of Ruben Sanchez, dangerous weapon, in
Instruction No.
5a. Aggravated Assault of Gabriel Tellez, dangerous weapon, in
Instruction No.
or
6. Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury of Ruben Sanchez No.
6a. Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury of Gabriel Tellez No.
or
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7. Assault with Bodily Injury of Ruben Sanchez in Instruction No.
7a. Assault with Bodily Injury of Gabriel Tellez in Instruction No.

However, you shall not find him guilty of Assault in Instruction Nos
, if you find him guilty of Aggravated
Robbery in Instruction Nos.

, or

Robbery in Instruction Nos.

.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and
to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend
himself against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is
justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to himself.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution. Therefore, if you
find that the defendant acted in self-defense or in the defense of a third party, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or mistake of fact
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense for the crime.
Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if he commits an act or omits to act under an
honest and reasonable belief in the existence of certain facts and circumstances
which, if true, would make such act or omission lawful.

'
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